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I.

Introduction

The Korean War is a watershed event in the history of the People’s Republic of China
[PRC] and the geopolitics of East Asia, marking the birth of the so-called “blood alliance”
between China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK], as well as China’s first
direct military conflict with the United States. Yet despite this historical significance—or perhaps
because of it—each participant of the war has portrayed the event in a different light,
maintaining significant propaganda efforts since the beginning of the war. In 1950, the Chinese
government launched a nationwide propaganda and mobilization movement under the slogan
“Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,” hailing the war a victory against the United States,
despite its conclusion with an armistice. Peng Dehuai, leading Marshal of the Chinese People’s
Volunteer Army [PVA], even remarked that “gone for ever [was] the time when the western
powers have been able to conquer a country in the [Far] East merely by mounting several
cannons along the coast.”1
Notwithstanding Peng’s remark, the Korean War is not yet gone. Without a peace treaty
to mark its end, the Korean War has “lived” on—but not its original conditions of 1950s-level
Cold War dynamics. The normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in the 1970s significantly altered
China’s relations with its Socialist allies and prompted its engagement with non-Socialist states.
DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, which received worldwide criticism since the 1990s, also led
the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] to reconsider its traditional relations with the DPRK,
Republic of Korea [ROK], and United States. These changes raise the question: did the CCP
change its interpretation of the Korean War, the event that started its involvement in the Korean

Peng Dehuai, Peng’s speech at the Twenty-fourth Session of the CPGC, Peng Dehuai Junshi Wenxuan [Selected military
writings of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Central Archives and Manuscripts Press, 1988), 445, cited in Zhang Shu Guang, Mao’s
Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 248.
1
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peninsula, and if so, what does that imply about the CCP’s evolving domestic and regional
political objectives?
While the Korean War and China’s political campaign surrounding it have been studied
extensively in China and beyond, there have been only limited attempts to understand how the
Chinese government’s interpretation of the war changed over time. Studying the CCP’s
interpretation of the Korean War can yield valuable insights about how the party views the
beginning, development, and future of its relationship with the DPRK, as well as how it positions
China vis-a-vis other countries involved in the war—the United States, ROK, the Soviet Union
(USSR, now Russia), and Japan. As a case study of how the CCP crafts official historical
narratives, the Korean War can also demonstrate how the party communicates to the general
public its foreign and domestic political agendas through its use of history.
This paper therefore studies the CCP’s changing Korean War narrative and associated
domestic and regional policy objectives. The paper examines anniversary speeches by CCP
leaders—such as Mao Zedong, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping—from 1950, the
beginning of the war, to 2010, the year when the last centrally-organized, national-scale Korean
War commemoration event was held. The speeches are collected primarily from Chinese
newspapers such as the People’s Daily and the People’s Liberation Army Daily [PLA Daily],
which, as major media outlets for the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army [PLA], have the
widest circulation and readership in China. This paper also references speeches or publications in
selected works of CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.2
This paper argues that the CCP used its Korean War narrative as a propaganda tool for
rallying domestic political support and signaling the CCP’s perception of its relations with the
2

For a full list, please refer to the Primary Source section of the bibliography.
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DPRK, ROK, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The Korean War narrative had always
responded to domestic needs, initially focused on consolidating the home front, and later on
legitimizing the CCP’s political rule. Since 1954, the narrative additionally served as an
international signaling tool for trumpeting PRC-DPRK relations. This DPRK-oriented message,
however, decreased in fervor during the Cultural Revolution and later from 1972 with PRC-U.S.
rapprochement, and from the 1990s the narrative’s international message expanded to
accommodate differing historical narratives of China’s new partners, such as the ROK.
Despite these changes, the CCP maintained its portrayal of the United States as China’s
opponent, intentional ambivalence on who started the war, justification of China’s intervention as
protecting China’s national interests, and emphasis on the “correct leadership” by the CCP. These
consistencies suggest that these messages’ underlying political objectives are still relevant today:
namely, its perception of rivalry with the United States, conciliatory approach to North Korea,
the CCP’s political correctness and legitimacy, and importance of buffer states in national
security.
This essay starts with a literature review, identifying relevant studies and their limitations.
It then looks into Korean War anniversary speeches to complement these limitations, evaluating
their changes and continuity over time to derive the political message behind the changes and, in
cases, lack thereof. The paper concludes with a discussion of the significance of what the
speeches tell us about the political objectives of the CCP.
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II.

Literature Review

Studies on the Korean War have existed since as early as the outbreak of the war itself.
Considering the vast amount of existing literature, this paper focuses on a selection of topics
from a combination of Chinese, English, and Korean works: the origins of the war; CCP’s
historical memory about the war; CCP propaganda and mobilization efforts during the war; and
the history of PRC-DPRK relations. This review reveals the need for more research on the CCP’s
usage of the Korean War narrative as a propaganda tool and the party’s underlying domestic and
international policy objectives during the “afterlife” of the war. To date, to the author’s
knowledge, no study analyzes the CCP’s Korean War commemoration speeches.

i)

Origins of the Korean War
The vast majority of works on the Korean War concentrate on understanding the origins

of the war. Regarding China, these works aim to answer when China decided to enter the Korean
War, and what factors were behind such a decision.
One of the most groundbreaking works on this topic is Allen S. Whiting’s 1960 book,
China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War. Whiting notably disagrees with
the then-popular U.S. understanding of the Korean War as an ideological war and the product of
the Socialist bloc’s expansionist ambitions. Instead, Whiting adopts a more security-oriented
approach, claiming that China’s intervention more likely budded from “general concern over the
range of opportunities within China that might be exploited by a determined, powerful enemy on
China's doorstep.”3 China Crosses the Yalu marks a shift in Korean War research from
ideological arguments to security-related analyses about China’s motivation for participating in
3 Allen

Suess Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York, MacMillan: 1960), 159.
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the Korean War; however, most of these efforts suffered from a lack of available resources
because most governmental internal documents on the Korean War remained classified.4
When the PRC and Russia declassified some of their high-level confidential documents
in the 1990s, scholarly work on the topic pivoted toward understanding the high diplomacy and
decision-making rationale of the three leaders—Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-sung. In
their paper “China’s Decision to Enter the War: History Revisited,” Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai
confirm the importance of security concerns from U.S. encroachment on DPRK-PRC borders in
Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War.5 Hao and Zhai argue that “[i]deology played an
important but not an absolute role in Mao’s decision, contrary to the views of most western
historians over the past three decades.”6 S. N. Goncharov, John Wilson Lewis, and Xue Litai, in
their book Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War, also argue that Mao entered
the war due to his perception that the United States’ ultimate goal behind intervening in the
Korean War was to threaten China.7 In Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist
Relations in the 1950s, Shen Zhihua additionally states that Mao’s decision was motivated by the
“Soviet factor,” namely the “compromise of its sovereignty in the Northeast” if the war expanded
to the Northeastern region of China and the USSR intervened.8 All these scholars focus on the
Korean War’s foreign policy aspect: namely, the CCP’s perception that participating in the
Korean War would help protect national interests from the threats posed by the USSR or the
United States.
See, for instance, Melvin Gurtov and Hwang Byong-Moo, China under Threat (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1980).
4

Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Devision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” The China Quarterly 121 (March
1990), 94-115.
5

6

Ibid., 114-115.

S. N. Goncharov, John Wilson Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1993), 159.
7

Shen Zhihua, Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s (Milton Park, Abingdon; New
York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 175-6.
8

Han 8
Some studies, on the other hand, try to bring light to non-security-related factors behind
the CCP’s decision-making. Chen Jian argues in his book China’s Road to the Korean War that
“China’s entry into the Korean War was determined by concerns much more complicated than
safeguarding the Chinese-Korean border.”9 Instead, Chen claims that “three fundamental and
interrelated rationales had dominated Beijing’s formulation of foreign policy and security
strategy: the party’s revolutionary nationalism, its sense of responsibility toward an Asian-wide
or worldwide revolution, and its determination to maintain the inner dynamics of the Chinese
revolution.”10 By focusing on the CCP’s self-perception of its ideology and world position, Chen
highlights the role of the CCP’s domestic motivations to participate in the Korean War. For
instance, Chen concludes that CCP propaganda during the war aimed at “chang[ing] the external
pressure caused by the Korean crisis into a driving force for promoting the continuation of the
great Chinese revolution.”11 By elucidating more domestically-driven objectives behind China’s
intervention, Chen ties the Korean War directly with domestic political ideology as opposed to
the CCP’s international threat perception.
While these works collectively help trace the motivations behind China’s entering the
Korean War, their focus on high politics and the CCP’s internal decision-making process bars
them from studying the ways in which CCP leaders communicated their goals to the masses. A
handful of studies that looked into CCP propaganda efforts, such as Whiting’s and Chen’s works,
demonstrate how such propaganda reflected and communicated the party’s objectives to the
domestic public; they are, however, very limited in their time scopes, not covering the changes of

Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: the Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994), 4.
9

10

Ibid., 213-4.

11

Ibid., 193.
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CCP perception and objectives toward North Korea in the afterlife of the war.

ii)

China’s Historical Memory of the Korean War
Another significant portion of literature addresses historical memory and commemoration

in China. By studying major creators (and creations) of historical memory such as museums,
veterans, and textbooks, these studies describe the CCP’s efforts to use China’s history toward its
political goals and how these goals changed over time.12
Among scholars studying the CCP’s historical commemoration of the Korean War, Jung
Keun-Sik notably researched the Memorial of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,
China’s predominant museum on the Korean War, tracing its creation and its historical
narrative.13 Jung states that the construction of the Memorial was “most significant within the
context of state formation and nation building in China, rather than in the context of international
politics,” highlighting the domestic propagandistic value that the war holds for the CCP.14
Regardless of this primary emphasis on domestic factors, Jung also notes that the CCP used the
war to position China vis-a-vis the United States and DPRK by underlining the “friendship”
between the Chinese and North Korean people while attempting to shift Chinese domestic

This study focuses on works pertinent to the Korean War. Some works that are not covered by this paper but are regardless
significant in this field include Neil J. Diamant, Embattled Glory: Veterans, Military Families, and the Politics of Patriotism in
China, 1949-2007 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publications, 2010); Neil J. Diamant, “Veterans, Organization, and the
Politics of Martial Citizenship in China,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no, 1 (2008): 119-158, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
23418654; Neil J. Diamant and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Veterans’ Political Activism in China,” Modern China 41, no. 3 (2015):
278-312, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24575609; and Hung Chang-tai, “The Cult of the Red Martyr: Politics of Commemoration
in China,” Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 2 (2008): 279-304, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30036507.
12

Jung Keun-Sik, “China's Memory and Commemoration of the Korean War in the Memorial Hall of the ‘War to Resist U.S.
Aggression and Aid Korea,’” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review, no. 14 (March 2015), 63-90. For studies
that include analyses of Korean War exhibition halls in larger museums, please refer to: Kirk A. Denton, Exhibiting the Past :
Historical Memory and the Politics of Museums in Postsocialist China (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2014);
Rana Mitter, “Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum,
1987-1997,” The China Quarterly, no. 161 (2000): 279-293, https://www.jstor.org/stable/655990; and Edward Vickers,
“Museums and Nationalism in Contemporary China,” Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education 37, no. 3 (June 2007):
365-382, DOI: 10.1080/03057920701330255.
13

Jung, “China's Memory and Commemoration of the Korean War in the Memorial Hall of the ‘War to Resist U.S. Aggression
and Aid Korea,” 70.
14
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perception of the United States from a subject of “worship” and “fear” to a target of
“resistance.”15 Jung thus highlights the Korean War’s propaganda value for the CCP, both in
terms of domestic nation-building and international positioning.
Another group of literature focuses on the CCP’s use of textbooks to shape historical
memory regarding the two Koreas. For instance, Yu Yong-Tae studies Chinese history textbooks
from 1997 to 2001 and argues that China has attempted to accommodate South Korea’s
perspectives after the Cold War, even when doing so would conflict with North Korea’s views.16
On the other hand, Yu mentions that while the Chinese government did not characterize the war
as a “liberation war” as the North Korean government does, it nonetheless opted for a limited
adoption of the North Korean perspective by not mentioning who started the war (DPRK) and
emphasizing the United States as an invader.17 Yu also highlights that by trumpeting the Korean
War as a massive success, the Chinese government aims at relieving Chinese students’ fear of the
United States and strengthening their nationalist sentiments.18
All of these works prove the CCP’s active use of the Korean War’s historical narrative to
bolster its political goals, while underscoring key components of that narrative such as the
portrayal of the United States as an “invader” or the deliberately ambiguous description of who
started the war. These studies, however, suggest several limitations of studying memorials or
textbooks. With long timeframes in between renovations—at times shut down for years—the
memorial is not fit for fast updates reflecting changes in CCP objectives. As Jung notes, that the
memorial is open to visitors of all nationalities additionally compromises the memorial’s
15

Ibid., 72-73.

Yu Yong-Tae 유용태, “Jungguk yeoksagyogwaseoui hyeondaesa insikgwa gukgajuui: hyeondae hanguksareul jungsimeuro” 중
국 역사교과서의 현대사 인식과 국가주의: 현대 한국사를 중심으로 [Modern History Awareness and Nationalism in Chinese
History Textbooks: Focusing on Modern Korean History], The Korean History Education Review 84 (December 2002): 187-222.
16

17

Ibid, 210.

18

Ibid., 213.
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usability as a domestic propaganda tool.19 Meanwhile, research on textbooks cover few editions
of textbooks, providing only a partial picture of the CCP’s historiography of the Korean War. The
audience of the medium is another limiting factor. Textbooks are geared toward students, which
limits their circulation within the broader society and potentially in content to render them more
accessible, thus failing to represent the CCP’s national propaganda strategy.

iii)

Chinese Propaganda Efforts during the Korean War
Studies on Chinese propaganda and mobilization efforts during the Korean War focus

mainly on how the CCP used the Korean War as propaganda material to bolster its contemporary
political objectives while garnering domestic support to continue war efforts. Several studies
investigate public responses to CCP propaganda, what existing public sentiment the CCP
harnessed, and the long-term social implications of the propaganda efforts.
One of the seminal English works in this field is Hajimu Masuda’s Cold War Crucible:
The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World.20 Masuda notes that the Chinese masses linked their
bitterness toward Japan with their attitude toward the United States, a sentiment that the CCP
actively kindled to mobilize the Chinese people during the Korean War. Masuda also describes
how the Chinese masses and the state jointly used the Korean War to “purify” the community,
eliminating dissent according to their imagined Cold War reality. Masuda thus emphasizes both
the Korean War’s usefulness to the CCP for domestic consolidation and, in turn, the difficult
political context in which the party decided to enter the Korean War.
Additional studies on Korean War propaganda have mainly been conducted by Chinese
19

Ibid., 67.

Hajimu Masuda, Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard
University Press, 2015).
20
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scholars. For instance, in his 2015 study, Zhang Fang investigates methods of media control
adopted by the CCP during the Korean War, highlighting the centralized and propagandized
nature of news production to ensure that news coverage fit the CCP’s political needs.21 Studies
by Lin Weijing in 2005 and 2007 similarly outline mobilization tactics, content, and methods,
including portraying the United States forces as “invaders,” heightening national pride, and
trumpeting war martyrs and heroes, all as means of encouraging further public participation in
the Korean War efforts.22
Another important study is Song Jin’s research on Deng Xiaoping’s interpretation of the
Korean War.23 Song studies characterizations of the Korean War in the Selected Works of Deng
Xiaoping, identifying themes including the essence of the war, comparison of power between the
United States and China, the righteousness of the cause of war, the source of China's threat, and
lessons for building Chinese military today.24 This study is one of the very few attempts to
understand CCP leaders’ changing interpretations of the Korean War over time, and is especially
Zhang Fang 张放, “Chaoxian zhanzheng zhong de Zhongguo xinwen shengchan (1950 ~ 1953)” 朝鲜战争中的中国新闻生产
（1950～1953）[Chinese newspaper production during the Korean War (1950 ~ 1953)], Dangshi Yanjiu yu Jiaoxue 党史研究与
教学, no. 5 (2015): 10-28.
21

Lin Weijing 林伟京, “<Renmin ribao> yu kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzheng zhongde zhengzhidongyuan” 《人民日报》与抗美
援朝战争中的政治动员 [People’s Daily and Political Mobilization during the War to Resist U.S.Aggression and Aid Korea],
Journal of Jiangxi Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition) 江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版) 3 (2007):
112-116; Lin Weijing 林伟京, “Shixi kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzheng zhong zhengzhi dongyuande neirong yu fangfa” 试析抗美
援朝战争中政治动员的内容与⽅法 [Analysis of Content and Methods of Political Mobilization during the War to Resist U.S.
Aggression and Aid Korea], Journal of South China Normal University (Social Science Edition) 华南师范⼤学学报(社会科学
版) 6 (2005): 140-142.
22

Examples of such studies include Ye Rentao 叶任涛, “Mao Zedong yu kang Mei yuan Chao” 毛泽东与抗美援朝 [Mao
Zedong and the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], Corpus of Party History 党史⽂汇 12 (2000): 12-15; Wu
Xiaobao 吴⼩宝, “Zhou Enlai dui kang Mei yuan Chao zhanzheng suozuo de zhongyao gongxian” 周恩来对抗美援朝战争所作
的重要贡献 [Zhou Enlai’s Major Contribution to the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], Journal of Zhangzhou
Vocational University 漳州职业⼤学学报 4 (2001): 9-13; and Zhang Min and Zhang Xiujuan, Zhou Enlai yu kang Mei yuan
Chao zhan zheng 周恩来与抗美援朝战争 [Zhou Enlai and the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], 1st edition
(Shanghai, China: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 2000).
23

Song Jin, “Deng Xiaoping guanyu kang Mei yuan Chao de ruogan shidian tanxi” 邓⼩平关于抗美援朝的若⼲视点探析
[Analysis of Deng Xiaoping’s View on the Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], Military Historical Research 军
事历史研究 1 (2001): 28-35.
24
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valuable in that it studies the 1970s and 1980s, a time of political limbo when PRC-U.S. and
PRC-ROK relations were both in flux.
These studies all offer detailed insights about the CCP’s propaganda efforts, their key
themes and messages, and underlying political objectives. Combined, they lay the foundation of
further analysis of propaganda speeches, allowing for comparison between wartime propaganda
and later propaganda efforts through commemoration. Their major limitation is, again, their
timeframe—the analyses do not extend beyond the wartime years, leaving the propaganda value
of the Korean War in its afterlife insufficiently researched.

iv)

Historical PRC-DPRK Relations
The last body of literature studies the history of PRC-DPRK relations. Publications on

this critical topic are surprisingly scarce, mostly due to the lack of reliable sources as North
Korean archives remain inaccessible to foreign scholars. The most seminal research on the topic
is Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng’s A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and
Sino-North Korean Relations, 1949-1976, a detailed analysis of PRC-DPRK relations from the
foundation of the PRC in 1949 to the end of Mao’s rule in 1976.25 Shen and Xia argue that “the
Sino-North Korean special relationship can be traced to 1958, when the Chinese People’s
Volunteer Army withdrew from North Korea.”26 Shen and Xia divides the 27 years into six time
periods, based on the ebbs and flows of high-level diplomacy between the PRC and DPRK: (i)
1950 to 1953, when the two countries experienced tensions due to the Korean War and their
differing national interests; (ii) 1953 to 1956, when Kim’s aspirations for more independence
Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and Sino-North Korean Relations,
1949-1976 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018).
25

26

Ibid., 4.

Han 14
clashed with Mao’s intention to keep North Korea as a vassal and protectorate; (iii) 1957 to
1960, when Mao, to bolster China’s rising international recognition in the Socialist bloc, tried to
draw Kim closer and started the so-called “special relationship”; (iv) 1961 to 1965, when Kim
balanced his relations with the USSR and PRC during the Sino-Soviet split to extract aid, while
China was willing to strengthen PRC-DPRK ties to solidify its own leadership in the Socialist
bloc; (v) 1965 to 1969, when PRC-DPRK ties cooled during the Cultural Revolution and China’s
self-imposed isolation; and (vi) 1970 to 1976, when China initially attempted to revive its ties
with DPRK to counter tensions with the USSR, but détente with the United States ended up
rupturing the “special” PRC-DPRK ties.27
Shen and Xia’s work is a rarity. There are virtually no authoritative works on PRC-DPRK
relations during the 1980s, due to lack of archival resources. The 1990s onwards, on the other
hand, suffer from a lack of consensus, with varying political speculations and diplomatic debates
on China’s intentions toward North Korea amid international efforts to curb the latter’s nuclear
program and dictatorship. With no conclusive answer, the PRC’s objectives toward DPRK
remains a hotly debated topic.
While limited in its timeframe, the existing works nonetheless provide background
knowledge critical for understanding PRC-DPRK relations and contextualizing any propaganda
messages crafted during the periods covered. Speculations on what PRC-DPRK relations would
have been during the 1980s and beyond, while not as authoritative in their assertions, would
regardless provide a good background for interpreting and evaluating the messages in CCP
speeches during these years.

27

Ibid., 8-11.
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Existing studies on the Korean War thus highlight the multiplicity of motivations behind
the CCP’s decision to intervene in the Korean War, including domestic goals of consolidating
political control, and international goals of gaining global prestige and protecting national
security from external threat. Research on Korean War commemoration suggests that the
political propagandist value of the war continues into the modern day, and analyses of wartime
propaganda strategies confirm that the CCP used the war as a political tool for domestic
mobilization and consolidation.
With the significance, in turn, comes a need. The outsized emphasis on the war and its
immediate aftermath results in gaps in research on the decades that follow. Museums and
textbooks, the main sources in extant scholarship, are imperfect case studies due to their lagging
responsiveness and narrow audience, respectively. Research on PRC-DPRK relations is
fragmented and incomplete, which all the more emphasizes a need for further research on the
matter. With this need in mind, this paper explores a new source—CCP commemoration
speeches on the Korean War—to better understand the propagandist value that the war holds for
the party and the contemporary domestic and international goals that the party aimed at
achieving through propaganda. With the relative consistency in which Korean War
commemoration events had been held for the past 60 years, this paper complements the
fragmented timelines of existing research and offers new insights by tapping into a medium
which has not been extensively researched.
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III.

CCP Commemoration Speeches, 1950 - 2010

A close analysis of CCP commemoration speeches suggests that the Korean War narrative
was indeed a multifaceted, malleable propaganda tool for the CCP to bolster domestic and
international objectives. Since its inception, the Korean War narrative served as a domestic
propaganda tool for rallying domestic support for the CCP, although the specific projects the
party tried supporting through the war changed over time. Internationally, the war narrative had
served as a means of signaling CCP support of the PRC’s diplomatic partners, initially focusing
on the DPRK and later accommodating new partners such as the United States, ROK, and
Russia.

i)

1950 - 1953: War Period
The years 1950 to 1953 set the initial discourse of the Korean War, including the basic

terminology, the general structure of the narrative on the war’s progress and China’s interests,
and the major takeaways from the war.
One key notion was that the United States was an “imperialist” power threatening other
countries’ sovereignty, including that of China. A June 1950 article by Mao Zedong in the
People’s Daily called for the people to unite and prepare for any U.S. provocations, labeling the
United States as an “imperialist power” for its interference in the internal affairs of other
countries.28 In his speech on October 24, 1951, Peng Zhen, Vice Chairman of the Chinese
People’s Committee to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, further elaborated this sentiment

Mao Zedong 毛泽东, “Tuanjie qilai dabai Meidiguozhuyi de renhe tiaoxin” 团结起来打败美帝国主义的任何挑衅 [Unite and
defeat any provocations from U.S. imperialism], in Jian guo yi lai Mao Zedong jun shi wen gao 建国以来毛泽东军事文稿 [The
military manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the Nation], 1st ed, vol. 1 (Beijing, China: Jun shi ke xue chu ban she,
2010), 154-5.
28
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by calling the United States “invaders,” charging them of, among other misdeeds, crossing the
38th Parallel into North Korean territory, “occupying” Taiwan, and crossing into China’s
airspace.29
In contrast, China was framed as a peace-cherishing nation that only entered the war due
to U.S. aggression. Mao, in his 1951 article, stated that “[w]e do not invade any nation; we only
oppose imperialists’ invasions into our country.”30 Peng’s speech similarly noted how the “U.S.
imperialists” delayed negotiations and continued their “desperate advance,” leading to the need
to continue the “Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.”31
While the United States was depicted as the invader, there was lack of emphasis on South
Korea’s role in the war. Indeed, most commemoration speeches did not even mention South
Korea; Mao’s article reflecting on the Korean War’s significance on September 12, 1953,
mentioned the “U.S. imperialists” but did not censure other U.S. allies.32 When mentioned, these
states were labeled as “accomplices” or “puppets,” portrayed as mere pawns of the United
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Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi diyijie quanguo weiyuanhui disanci huiyi shang de baogao” 关于抗美援朝保家卫国
运动的报告——一九五一年十月二十四日在中国人民政治协商会议第一届全国委员会第三次会议上的报告 [Report
regarding the Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Guard Home and Defend the Country Movement—Reported in the October
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States.33 The war, thus, was framed as one undertaken by the United States alone.
Another major concept established during this period was the CCP’s dual justification of
China’s intervention on both realpolitik and ideological grounds to convince the domestic
population to support the war and the CCP’s leadership. Peng’s 1951 speech, for instance,
rationalized China’s entering the war through two fronts: necessity to counter U.S. hostility
toward China and the righteous cause of promoting peace against U.S. imperialist ambitions.34
Quoting Mao to describe the “U.S. invasion” of not only DPRK but also Taiwan and China’s
airspace, Peng concluded that China must fight the war to protect the country from direct
invasion. To Peng, the Korean War was also an ideological attack, as he equated the Chinese
“success” with proof that the judgments of Mao and Stalin were correct—that is, the Chinese
efforts to counter “unjust,” invasive ambitions of U.S. imperialism were succeeding due to their
“just,” ideologically correct nature.35 This ideological argument was reflected in the CCP’s
characterization of the United States, which was purportedly a “paper tiger” that was “strong on
the outside, weak on the inside” since it lacked the political correctness that the PRC and USSR
enjoyed.36 Mao, in his 1953 article, similarly described the lesson of the war as follows: “by
relying on the people, and a relatively correct leadership, we can use our inferior materiel to
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triumph over enemies with superior materiel.”37 The political connection here was obvious: it
was the CCP’s correct leadership and political will under Socialist ideology that led to China’s
victory of the Korean War. With the United States described as inferior to China in terms of
political correctness and (consequentially) actual military might, Communist China was
portrayed as a victorious challenger of the United States.
Unlike with the United States, however, the CCP did not attempt to differentiate itself
from its communist allies: the USSR and DPRK. All speeches from these years described the war
as a joint victory with the North Korean military, even while emphasizing domestic
accomplishments under the Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.38 Peng’s 1951
speech lauded the role of the Soviet Union as the leader of the international Socialist bloc, stating
that “during the struggle to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the Chinese people of all
classes . . . recognized the peaceful, democratic countries and people worldwide who cherish
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peace, led by the Soviet Union.”39
Overall, these speeches established the basis of the subsequent Korean War rhetoric. The
antagonistic positioning of the United States vis-a-vis China, emphasis on U.S. “aggression” and
China’s “forced” entry into war as a peace-loving nation, and calls to unite under the righteous
CCP leadership, were all seen in later speeches.
What differentiated the wartime years, however, was the CCP’s mainly domestic focus in
its Korean War narrative. The realpolitik argument of China being under U.S. siege was
consistently invoked, arguing that mainland China was protected by fighting the Korean War, as
suggested in the full name of the movement: Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Protect the
Home and the Nation. Other countries such as the USSR and DPRK were merely acknowledged
as partner nations, suggesting that the Korean War narrative bore more value for domestic
rallying through an invocation of an enemy (the United States) than in international positioning
of the PRC. Indeed, even the ideological argument of fighting under the righteous cause of
Socialism that positioned China in the communist bloc tied back to the CCP’s political
legitimacy and domestic war mobilization efforts. Peng’s speech is an explicit example, calling
for “eliminating imperialist spies hidden in all corners of China,” and establishing a so-called
“home front.”40 The domestic emphasis reflected the issues the CCP faced in continuing the war:
general war fatigue after the Chinese Civil War and the CCP’s still-shaky control over mainland
China. The Korean War narrative was thus crafted as a propagandist tool to serve the CCP’s
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political purposes since its inception; it was, however, mainly focused on domestic needs in its
earlier years.

ii)

1954 - 1956: Post-War
In the years immediately following the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in

1953, there were no reports of domestic, centrally-organized commemoration events offered by
the CCP. Against the backdrop of contemporary political challenges, the lack of commemoration
during these years further confirmed the Korean War narrative’s domestic propaganda value,
while suggesting for the first time its usage for international signaling.
The decrease in domestic commemoration since 1953 confirmed that the CCP’s initial
main purpose of celebrating the war was for domestic wartime mobilization. The events closest
to central commemoration were those organized by the PVA leadership in Pyongyang in 1954
and 1955. News coverage of PVA leaders’ speeches, while very short and mainly reiterating
earlier speeches’ content, newly emphasized the need for the military—and not the Chinese
people as a whole, unlike previous speeches—to remain “vigilant” and continue fighting until the
final victory.41 This change most likely reflected the reduced necessity to garner war support
after the signing of the armistice, which, in turn, decreased the need to commemorate the war.
The only people who needed to stay mobilized were military personnel, not the Chinese public.
The additional decrease in commemoration fervor in 1956, meanwhile, most likely
reflected the cooling of PRC-DPRK relations that year, suggesting the first use of the Korean
“Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun lingdao jiguan juxing dahui jinian kang Mei yuan Chao sizhounian” 中国人民志愿军领导机关
举行大会纪念抗美援朝四周年 [Chinese People’s Volunteer Army leadership organize convention to commemorate fourth
anniversary of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), October 27,
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War as an international signaling tool. In 1956, there was no central event hosted in Pyongyang,
with individual troops celebrating the anniversary on their own.42 There was one hosted by the
DPRK Ambassador to China, but the PLA Daily coverage of the speech delivered by the Chinese
representative, General Gan Siqi, was merely three lines, reiterating China’s call for vigilance
amid U.S. and ROK threats of “northern invasion.”43 This cooling of celebration fervor was most
likely due to Kim Il-sung’s purge of domestic political factions, which left the Chinese
leadership dissatisfied. Discord worsened in 1956 after failed attempts to weaken Kim’s political
power by the “Yan’an faction,” a political faction within the DPRK with ties to Beijing which
inspired Kim’s massive political purge in August.44 The lack of commemoration events in 1956
in the usual month of October suggested that the Korean War narrative was actively used by the
CCP to convey an international message for the first time: discontent toward the DPRK.

iii)

1957 - 1958: Improving PRC-DPRK Ties
The PRC’s Korean War commemoration in 1957 and 1958, in turn, reflected the

improvement of PRC-DPRK ties, portraying the DPRK as a respectable partner of the PRC.
Continuation of touting the CCP’s decision to enter the war as “correct,” meanwhile, suggested
the CCP’s continued use of the narrative for domestic propaganda.
In 1957, Mao desired to improve PRC-DPRK ties against the backdrop of the rising
international status of the PRC. As Shen and Xia describe, Mao believed that “he was much more
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sophisticated theoretically than Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and that therefore the CCP was
quite qualified to be a coleader [sic] of the socialist camp”; thus, it “became necessary that China
exhibit some magnanimity toward the DPRK.”45 This approach led to improved bilateral
communication between the PRC and DPRK during the latter half of 1957. Mao later withdrew
all PVA forces from the DPRK to accommodate Kim’s desire to unify Korea independently,
further strengthening their relations.46
The CCP ramped up its celebration of the Korean War accordingly. In 1957 October, the
PVA leadership reinstated its commemoration event in Pyongyang.47 Especially important was
Commander Yang Yong’s 1958 October report of the PVA’s work to the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress and the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference.48
In his speech, Yang extensively highlighted the DPRK’s contribution in the war and
actively positioned China as a respectful partner, unlike previous speeches that focused mainly
on the domestic implications of the war. Stating that the war “further strengthened . . . the
traditional friendship between the people of China and North Korea,” Yang equated “the North
Korean people’s suffering” to “the suffering of our own and all of mankind.”49 Yang argued that
“the Korean problem [was] one that the Korean people should resolve themselves with no
foreign interference,” and that the PVA’s withdrawal was a demonstration of China’s respect of
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DPRK sovereignty.50 Yang even claimed that the North Korean people’s “brave struggle and
sublime patriotism and internationalism educated [the PVA] extremely profoundly.”51 Yang
conveyed a more equal relationship between the DPRK and PRC, emphasizing the DPRK’s
wartime contributions and Socialist standing much more extensively than previous speeches.
Yang further demonstrated respect toward the DPRK by adopting the DPRK’s war
narrative into his, delivering the first public speech to state that the Korean War began as an
invasion from the south orchestrated by the United States. Yang claimed that “the American
imperialists abetted their follower, the Rhee Syngman clique, and began the long-schemed attack
on the [DPRK],” deviating from previous CCP narratives that blamed the United States only for
“meddling with other countries’ internal affairs” and “intruding into North Korean territory” after
the war began, but never for starting the war itself.52 The new narrative came from the DPRK,
which had long argued that the war began from a southern invasion. That China openly adopted
this narrative into its own suggested that the CCP put increased value on PRC-DPRK relations.
Nevertheless, domestic propaganda messages remained strong. Yang argued that the
Korean War proved that “if peace-cherishing people across the world want[ed] to gain peace,
they need[ed] to take proactive actions to resist violence and stop invasion.”53 This reaffirmed
the correctness of the CCP’s decision to enter the war; in Yang’s words, “the victory of the
Korean War [was] the victory of the CCP’s and Chairman Mao’s wise decision, and the victory
of Chairman Mao Thought.”54 While Yang still characterized the Socialist bloc as led by the
USSR, Yang additionally stated that PRC-DPRK relations will “strengthen the power of the
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Socialist bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union.”55 By extolling China’s contributions to
the international Socialist bloc, the speech not only reflected China’s growing ambition to exert
more global leadership, but also its growing need for domestic legitimacy in the aftermath of the
Hundred Flowers Campaign in 1957 and its promotion of the Great Leap Forward starting in
1958.
The period 1957 to 1958 evinced an improvement of PRC-DPRK relations after its
relative cooling during the preceding years. If the year 1958 was the beginning of a “special
relation” as claimed by Shen and Xia, the speeches indeed suggested an effort to strengthen
bilateral ties. The international signaling value of the Korean War increased here, with active
positioning of China vis-a-vis not just the United States but also North Korea. The war’s
domestic propaganda value, while less prominent than in preceding years, still remained, as can
be seen in the emphasis of the CCP and Mao’s “wise decision” throughout the speech.

iv)

1960 - Early 1966: Pivot to DPRK
Speeches from 1960 to 1966 demonstrated the CCP’s attempt to further solidify PRC-

DPRK relations, with the Korean War narrative focusing more on international signaling than
domestic propaganda. However, domestic rallying remained a key factor in the narrative as the
CCP emphasized the continuing need to struggle against the United States.
The 1960s witnessed growing PRC-USSR rivalry, as each strived to garner support from
other countries in the Socialist bloc—including the DPRK—to establish itself as the leader of the
Socialist bloc and the International Communist Movement.56 Reflecting the CCP’s desire to win
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DPRK support, Chinese leadership brought the spotlight of the Korean War to the DPRK by
dramatically shifting its main national commemoration date from October 25, when China
entered the war, to June 25, when the war began. Actively adopting the DPRK’s war narrative by
calling the war the “Great Fatherland Liberation War,” these June events were hosted annually
except for the year 1962, while China’s entry into the Korean War was celebrated only on 1960
and 1965.
Speeches during the June events indicated the CCP’s desire to give the DPRK more credit
and portray the two countries’ bond as advancing the benefit of the Socialist bloc in terms of
security and ideological development. In all events, CCP leaders argued that the U.S. imperialists
started the invasive war against North Korea, touting the “heroic North Korean people” and their
victorious struggle against the invaders and expressing continued Chinese support of the DPRK’s
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struggle against U.S. threat.57 Except for the 1960 June, 1960 October, and 1965 October
celebrations, which characterized the victory of the war as jointly earned, all subsequent
speeches characterized the war as a unilateral victory of the DPRK, with Chinese participation
only briefly mentioned.58 Not only getting credit for winning the war, the DPRK also got credit
See, for instance, “Jinian Chaoxian renmin fandui Meiguo qinlüe de zuguo jiefang zhanzheng shizhounian Shoudu wanren
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June 26, 1964, accessed April 5, 2020; “Zai shoudu gejie renmin jinian ‘liu · erwu’ shiwu zhounian zhichi Chaoxian renmin fan
Mei douzheng yue dahui shang Liu Ningyi fuweiyuanzhang de jianghua” 在首都各界人民纪念“六·二五”十五周年支持朝鲜人
民反美斗争月大会上刘宁一副委员长的讲话 [Vice Committee Chair Liu Ningyi’s speech at the convention of people of all
walks of life of the capital commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of ‘6.25’ and month of supporting North Korean people’s
anti-U.S. struggle], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1965, accessed April 5, 2020; and “Shoudu jihui
jinian Chaoxian jiefang zhanzheng shiliu zhounian Chen Yi fuzongli he Lin Feng, Liu Ningyi fuweiyuanzhang deng lingdaoren
chuxi le dahui” 首都集会纪念朝鲜解放战争十六周年陈毅副总理和林枫、刘宁一副委员长等领导人出席了大会 [Capital
rally commemorate sixteenth anniversary of North Korea’s Great Fatherland Liberation War; Leaders such as Vice Premier Chen
Yi, Vice Chairmen Lin Feng and Liu Ningyi attend conference], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1966,
accessed February 22, 2020.
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for protecting China’s safety; as Guo Moruo stated in 1960, “through their heroic fight, the North
Korean people not only defended their sacred territory, but also defended the entire Socialist
bloc, and directly used their flesh and blood to support [China].”59 These speeches interpreted the
Korean War as mainly undertaken by the DPRK, with the Chinese people having unilaterally
benefitted from the DPRK’s fight and accordingly owing gratitude and recognition to the DPRK.
Meanwhile, the lack of recognition and later criticism of the USSR reflected the ongoing
Sino-Soviet split and the CCP’s denouncement of the USSR as revisionist.60 Only the 1960
speeches mentioned the USSR as the leader of the Socialist bloc; subsequent speeches did not
mention the USSR at all, and the 1966 speech by Foreign Minister Chen Yi directly criticized the
USSR as “revisionists.”61 Hailing what Chen characterized in his 1962 speech as the “proletarian
internationalist friendship between the people of China and North Korea that was sealed with
blood,” the CCP attempted to portray China (and DPRK) as more ideologically proper than the
USSR, implying its legitimacy as the international leader of the Socialist bloc.
Despite these international messages, the speeches maintained their domestic
propagandistic value. All speeches consistently emphasized the U.S. “occupation” of Taiwan and
invasion of Chinese territorial sovereignty, and speeches in 1960 and 1962 also argued that U.S.
imperialists’ “invasive” or “bandit-like” nature “cannot be changed,” calling for fighting against
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the United States to continue instead of attempting to negotiate.62 This sentiment culminated in
1966 when Chen called for the nation to push for the Cultural Revolution and unite under Mao
Zedong Thought to “carry through to the end the struggle to resist imperialism, resist
revisionism, [and] resist reactionaries in each country.”63 Even when the Korean War narrative
pivoted toward international signaling, the CCP kept using the Korean War for domestic
objectives nonetheless.

v)

Later 1966 - 1969: Cultural Revolution
Between the latter half of 1966 and 1969, no reports of CCP-hosted commemoration

events of the Korean War were found. The only exception was a brief 1968 People’s Daily article
that reported on the local sacrifice offering ceremony held at the Martyrs Cemetery of the
“Jinian Chaoxian renmin fandui Meiguo qinlüe de zuguo jiefang zhanzheng shizhounian Shoudu wanren jihui zhichi Chaoxian
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Ribao (1946-Present), June 26, 1965, accessed April 5, 2020; “Shoudu jihui jinian Chaoxian jiefang zhanzheng shiliu zhounian
Chen Yi fuzongli he Lin Feng, Liu Ningyi fuweiyuanzhang deng lingdaoren chuxi le dahui” 首都集会纪念朝鲜解放战争十六
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Chinese People's Volunteers at Shenyang and Dandong.64 Even here, however, the report made
no political commentary except for a brief paragraph hailing the martyrs’ extraordinary
“revolutionary spirit” and calling for the Chinese people to “carry through to the end the
proletariat Cultural Revolution and . . . the revolutionary struggle against imperialism,
revisionism, and reactionaries.”65
The fact that the Korean War was not used more often for domestic propaganda has a
number of potential explanations. Some believe that this was due to the denouncement of Peng
Dehuai, Leading Marshal of the PVA during the Korean War; invoking a war effort led by a
denounced marshal may have been too risky during the Cultural Revolution.66 Another
explanation is that PRC-DPRK relations during the Cultural Revolution were lukewarm at best.
Shen and Xia argue that bilateral relations during this period deteriorated due to China’s “radical
and uncompromising foreign and domestic policies.”67 Ma Jisen, in her study of the Chinese
Foreign Ministry during the Cultural Revolution, also mentions that the Chinese fervor to
disseminate Mao Zedong Thought through overseas missions estranged North Korea, and efforts
to improve bilateral ties came only in 1970 when Chinese ambassadors, recalled during the
Cultural Revolution, were sent back to DPRK.68 Considering that the Korean War was invoked
just before the Cultural Revolution as a key connection between the two countries, the
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subsequent cooling of relations might have sufficed for the CCP to stop invoking the war. Either
way, the Korean War, previously actively celebrated for propaganda purposes, suffered low
commemoration during the late 1960s precisely due to its political value. That the war was not
invoked during politically sensitive times all the more highlighted the war narrative’s usage as
political propaganda.

vi)

1970 - 1971: Reviving PRC-DPRK Ties
The CCP broke its long hiatus and held two Korean War commemoration events in 1970,

the first celebrating the 20th anniversary of the “Great Fatherland Liberation War” on June 25,
and the second commemorating the 20th anniversary of China’s entry into the war on October
25.69 An additional anniversary celebration of June 25 was held on 1971.70 The adjusted narrative
again demonstrated the CCP’s use of the Korean War for international signaling, calling for
closer ties with the DPRK amid rising tensions with the USSR.
CCP leadership speeches from all three events delivered the same narrative as the early
1960s speeches. For instance, the 1970 June speech, delivered by State Council Deputy Prime

“Zai shoudu renmin jinian Chaoxian zuguo jiefang zhanzheng ershi zhounian he shengtao Mei diguo zhuyi bazhan woguo
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国台湾大会上 李先念同志的讲话 [Comrade Li Xiannan’s speech at the capital’s people’s convention for the twentieth
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Minister Li Xiannian, stated that the U.S. imperialists started the war against the DPRK as a step
to invade China.71 Claiming the war as the DPRK’s victory, Li stated that North Korea
successfully thwarted the United States’ “outrageous scheme to take over Asia and seek
hegemony of the world.”72 Li also characterized PRC-DPRK relations as a “solid militant
friendship forged by fresh blood,” continuing the early 1960s trend of praising the bilateral
relationship.73 Li called the United States the “most ferocious enemy of the people across the
world,” but stated that the people must not fear it and fight against “U.S. imperialists,” again
mobilizing the domestic population by invoking a need to fight against a threatening enemy.74
Li’s Korean War narrative did, however, have a notable development—Japan was
included in the list of enemies. In his criticism against the United States, Li stated that it “already
revived Japanese militarism,” that “the Japanese reactionaries [were] trying to go down the same
road of Tojo Hideki,” and that “the U.S. imperialists [were] using Japanese reactionaries as the
daring vanguard of its invasion into Asia.”75 Lumping the United States and Japan together as the
PRC and DPRK’s enemy, Li announced that “if the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries dare
impose[d] another invasive war upon the people of China and North Korea, the Chinese
people . . . will unite with the North Korean people as before, fight shoulder to shoulder, and
thoroughly defeat the invaders.”76
Villainizing Japan reflected the newfound foreign policy needs of the CCP. The post“Zai shoudu renmin jinian Chaoxian zuguo jiefang zhanzheng ershi zhounian he shengtao Mei diguo zhuyi bazhan woguo
Taiwan dahui shang Li Xiannian tongzhi de jianghua” 在首都人民纪念朝鲜祖国解放战争二十周年和声讨美帝国主义霸占我
国台湾大会上 李先念同志的讲话 [Comrade Li Xiannan’s speech at the capital’s people’s convention for the twentieth
anniversary of North Korea’s Great Fatherland Liberation War and condemning the U.S. imperialists’ forcible occupation of our
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Cultural Revolution return of PRC diplomats to DPRK and mutual hostility toward Japan in
1970 allowed for improved PRC-DPRK relations.77 The March 1969 PRC-USSR border conflict
over the Zhenbao/Damansky Island and concerns over the possibility of a major military
confrontation with the USSR also prompted the CCP to lure the DPRK away from Moscow and
closer to Beijing.78 These factors created a favorable environment for PRC-DPRK
rapprochement; as Shen and Xia contend, “China . . . mended fences with North Korea before
the process of rapprochement with the United States entered into full swing.”79 The speeches’
addition of Japan in the list of enemies could have easily been a reflection of joint wariness of
Japan’s rise in Asia as well as the rekindled camaraderie between the PRC and DPRK.

vii)

1972 - 1978: U.S.-PRC Rapprochement
This PRC-DPRK camaraderie, however, was damaged as the CCP sought another avenue

of balancing USSR threats—the United States. With the famous “Ping-Pong diplomacy” in April
1971, PRC-U.S. relations improved rapidly, with U.S. National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger’s visit in July 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972, and normalization of
relations in 1979.80
As if reflecting these developments, there were no reports of CCP-hosted Korean War
commemoration events during these years. The only report was a People’s Daily article on a
regional tomb-sweeping occasion in Liaoning Province to commemorate the 25th anniversary of
China’s entry to the Korean War, but the article merely covered facts about the event (i.e. tomb-
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sweeping and wreath presentations) with no political interpretation of the event attached.81
Amid ongoing engagement with the United States, invoking “U.S. imperialism” and its
“invasive schemes” may have simply not been palatable. The DPRK’s unilateral actions that
escalated tensions in the Korean Peninsula since 1974 may have furthered the CCP’s desire to
distance itself from the DPRK.82 Shen and Xia argue that “China’s primary foreign policy goal
[from 1970 to 1976] was to maintain détente with Washington . . . to form a united front to
counter the Soviet threat and to prevent a resumption of war on the Korean Peninsula.”83 If so,
messages that the Chinese people would “unite with the North Korean people” to “struggle
against a common enemy” and “support North Korea’s efforts for unification,” per earlier
speeches, may have been the last signal that the CCP wanted to give to the DPRK.

viii)

1979 - 1989: Pivot to Domestic and Academic Significance
Three years after Mao’s death, a year after Hua Guofeng’s replacement by Deng

Xiaoping as Mao’s successor, and the year when U.S.-PRC relations were normalized, 1979
marked a watershed moment in Chinese history on all accounts. The following years witnessed a
significant reeling back of politically-charged rhetoric, and topics considered taboo during the
Cultural Revolution were more openly discussed. While this allowed for the proliferation of
academic studies on veterans’ experiences during the Korean War, the CCP refrained from
hosting central commemoration events. A potential explanation is the souring PRC-DPRK
relations amid Deng’s rapprochement with capitalist countries and his resolve to prevent
“Liaoning sheng geweihui Shenyang budui Shenyang shi geweihui deng jisao kang Mei yuan Chao lieshimu” 辽宁省⾰委会
沈阳部队沈阳市⾰委会等 祭扫抗美援朝烈士墓 [Liaoning Province Revolutionary Committee Shenyang Division, Shenyang
Municipal Revolutionary Committee and others sweep Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea Martyrs' Cemetery], People’s
Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), October 26, 1975, accessed August 16, 2019.
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entanglement in another Korean war.
Since 1979, posthumously reinstated Peng Dehuai was oft invoked in news articles. A
1979 PLA Daily article by Deng Hua, Li Zhimin, and Hong Xuezhi, all high-ranking PLA
soldiers and Korean War veterans, reminisced how they “deeply miss[ed] the respected and loved
commander Comrade Peng Dehuai,” reflecting on his brilliance as a military strategist and
politician, and his admirable qualities that rendered him as “a model that we should learn from
forever.”84 Similar articles throughout this period hailed Peng as a hero that everyone must learn
from.85 The posthumous exoneration of Peng allowed a part of the Korean War’s historical
memory to be at least tolerated, if not incorporated, by CCP leaders.
Additionally, starting from the 1985 publication of The Political Work of the Chinese
People’s Volunteer Army during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, China saw a
significant increase in academic research with approvals or publications by government-affiliated
organizations.86 That the aforementioned book was “written over 20 years ago but was shelved
due to historical reasons,” according to a People’s Daily article, all the more emphasized how the
politically relaxed environment contributed to the increase in Korean War research in China.87
Nevertheless, this political environment did not contribute to the proliferation of general
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Korean War commemoration events. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there was not a
single CCP-hosted central commemoration event during these years, with only a handful of
reports on DPRK-led events; even the 30th anniversary was overlooked in 1980. There are only
intermittent reports of regional tomb-sweeping or wreath presentation events at the Martyrs
Cemetery, but none of these reports included political commentary or speeches.88
This reluctance to celebrate the Korean War may be due to the growing divergence
between the PRC and DPRK under Deng’s economic reform policies, combined with Deng’s
reluctance to take a conciliatory attitude to North Korea during most of his tenure. Shen and Xia
state that “China’s post-1978 policy of ‘reform and opening’ to the outside world shattered the
economic foundation of the Sino-North Korean ‘special relationship,’” and warming relations
between Beijing and Seoul further worried the DPRK leadership.89 In 1985, Deng even stated
that “[China] should not give the North Koreans the wrong impression that whatever they ask for
[China] will give them,” and, after Vietnam and Albania’s falling out with Beijing, “[China]
should be prepared for the third one [North Korea] to fall out with [China].”90 Deng’s reluctance
to maintain a conciliatory approach to the DPRK, as well as his prioritization of rapprochement
See, for instance, “Liaoning sheng Shenyang shi gejie he zhujun jisao kang Mei yuan Chao lieshimu” 辽宁省沈阳市各界和驻
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Aid Korea Martyrs' Cemetery], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), October 26, 1980, accessed August 16, 2019;
“Liaoning gejie daibiao xiang kang Mei yuan Chao lieshimu jingxian huaquan jinian Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun fu Chao
canzhan 31 zhounian” 辽宁各界代表向抗美援朝烈⼠墓敬献花圈 纪念中国⼈民志愿军赴朝参战31周年 [Liaoning province
representatives of various circles offer wreaths at Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea Martyrs’ Cemetery to celebrate the 31st
anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s going to Korea and entering the war], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao
(1946-Present), October 27, 1981, accessed August 16, 2019; “Shenyang shi juxing jisao huodong daonian kang Mei yuan Chao
zhanzheng zhong xisheng de lieshi” 沈阳市举行祭扫活动悼念抗美援朝战争中牺牲的烈士 [Shenyang city holds tombsweeping activity to mourn the martyrs of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao
(1946-Present), April 5, 1984, accessed August 16, 2019; “Liaoning gejie daibiao qingming jisao kang Mei yuan Chao lieshi
lingyuan” 辽宁各界代表清明祭扫抗美援朝烈⼠陵园 [Liaoning Province representatives of various circles sweep the Resist
U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea Martyr’s Cemetery during Qingming], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), April 6,
1985, accessed August 16, 2019; and “Liaoning sheng he Shenyang shi qunzhong qianwang kang Mei yuan Chao lieshi lingyuan
xian huaquan” 辽宁省和沈阳市群众前往抗美援朝烈⼠陵园献花圈 [Liaoning province and Shenyang city masses go to Resist
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with capitalist countries, all the more alienated the DPRK.
Considering how Korean War commemoration speeches were used as an international
signaling tool, the CCP’s silence could be interpreted as the party’s message to the DPRK that
the “special relationship” was no longer, or at least that the PRC was trying to distance itself
from the DPRK. Perhaps the CCP itself was unsure of its objectives with DPRK at the time, or at
least did not want to publicize them. Indeed, scholars have faced significant difficulties
identifying Deng’s foreign policy goals toward the DPRK during the 1980s, as reflected in the
dearth of scholarly research on the topic. While it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion on
Deng’s intentions, one thing is clear—PRC-DPRK relations were increasingly waning.

ix)

1989 - 1990: Tiananmen Square
With improved PRC-DPRK ties in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, the

years 1989 and 1990 marked the return of Korean War commemoration; the rhetoric itself,
however, suggested that the CCP’s bigger objective was domestic consolidation rather than
international signaling or affirmation of PRC-DPRK ties.
Existing scholarship suggests that Deng’s approach to the DPRK changed in the
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, which brought forth international backlash and
criticism of the CCP’s violation of human rights. Shen and Xia claim that “[i]n the wake of the
Tiananmen Square incident and the fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, in
1989 . . . Beijing and Pyongyang became fellow sufferers who could commiserate with each
other.”91 Song’s research into Deng’s perspective on the Korean War similarly notes how Deng,
after the Tiananmen Square incident, argued that Western countries and the United States had no
91
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right to criticize China of “human rights violations” considering the high casualties they inflicted
on China during the war.92
Reflecting these improved bilateral ties was the revival of Korean War commemoration
events after a more-than-a-decade long hiatus, with the CCP’s October celebration of the 40th
anniversary of its entry to the Korean War.93 During the event, Zhou Wenyuan, Vice-Chair of the
PLA’s General Political Department, stated that the “great victory” of the Korean War protected
China’s safety and world peace, allowed for China’s national reconstruction, raised the Chinese
people’s political consciousness and national pride, stimulated the country’s revolutionary
energy, and promoted China’s national defense and modernization.94 He then noted that the
“profound friendship” with the North Korean people was formed during the war and survived the
test of time during the post-war decades.95 This invocation of PRC-DPRK ties suggested that the
CCP indeed warmed up to the DPRK after the Tiananmen Square incident, again emphasizing
the international signaling value of the Korean War.
This acknowledgement of ties, however, was the farthest the CCP would go in
highlighting its relations with North Korea; the rest of the speech suggested that since 1990 the
CCP pivoted toward emphasizing the Korean War’s domestic historical significance than its
international legacies. The vast majority of the People’s Daily article covering the 1980 event
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focused on the speeches by various “comrades” including former PVA Commander Yang Dezhi,
which barely mentioned the DPRK and discussed mainly the domestic takeaways of the war.
Specifically, these speeches argued that the greatest legacy of the war was the “spirit” it
embodied, such as the unity of people under patriotism, revolutionary heroism, and the CCP’s
correct leadership that led to ultimate victory.96 The speeches concluded that this “spirit” must be
applied in the modern context to promote the nation’s and the military’s Socialist
modernization.97 This new emphasis of the “spirit” of the Korean War diverted attention away
from the notion of “struggle” against an adversary or wartime specificities, including who the
enemy was or who fought with the Chinese—indeed, not even once was the United States or
“imperialism” mentioned besides in the slogan “Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.” The
speeches instead emphasized the Chinese people’s conduct and accomplishments during the war
—what the speeches called the war’s “spirit.” This domestic shift in attention in turn allowed for
domestic rallying of the people toward ongoing CCP projects—in this case “modernization”—
under the “correct leadership” of the CCP.
The developments in the Korean War narrative from 1989 to 1990 demonstrated the
CCP’s prioritization of the Korean War’s domestic propaganda value over international
signaling, amid uncertainties in China’s relationship with the DPRK and growing ties with the
United States. The revival of only the October commemorations—and not the June events—
further demonstrated this domestic emphasis. In particular, the newly coined concept of a
uniquely Chinese “spirit” that called for the Chinese nation to work toward the country’s
Socialist modernization paralleled Deng’s 1986 initiative of “Socialist Spiritual Civilization,”
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which aimed at strengthening the CCP’s political-ideological control over the country and
continuing the country’s socialist development.98 Thus, while the revival of Korean War
commemoration may have been influenced by warming PRC-DPRK ties, these international
objectives were overshadowed by the war narrative’s domestic propaganda messages.

x)

1993: PRC-ROK Rapprochement
Starting from the 1990s, there were very few commemoration events except ten-year

anniversary speeches. Regardless, the 1990s witnessed one unique commemoration event of the
war: the opening ceremony of the Memorial of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea
in 1993.99 Hu Jintao’s speech at the event demonstrated the CCP’s continuing emphasis on the
domestic takeaways of the Korean War; his lack of emphasis on PRC-DPRK ties, on the other
hand, reflected China’s improving relations with the United States and South Korea, and these
new partners’ subsequent challenges to China’s previously DPRK-centric war narrative.
Hu’s Korean War narrative, at first glance, was emphatically domestically oriented. First,
Hu’s speech barely mentions the DPRK. Claiming that China entered the war when “the DPRK
was at a critical juncture and [China’s] safety was seriously threatened,” Hu praised the “wise
decision” of the CCP and Mao to enter the war.100 Hu then stated that the Chinese PVA, under the
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leadership of Peng Dehuai, created a heroic feat that shocked the world.101 Touting the Korean
War “spirit” as did the 1990 speech, Hu called for the Chinese people to inherit the patriotism
and revolutionary heroism of the Korean War and contribute to China’s reconstruction, Socialist
modernization, and unification.102 Nowhere did the article mention China’s “combat friendship”
with DPRK as did earlier speeches. By emphasizing China’s national security and mentioning
only the PVA’s “feats,” Hu delivered a domestically centered narrative that barely acknowledged
the DPRK.
Hu’s speech also significantly toned down accusations against the United States. Hu
stated that the world was moving from a bipolar to a multipolar world, and argued that China
needed a stable long-term environment in both domestic and international realms to continue its
progress toward modernization. Hu also emphasized that China never was and never will claim
to dominate the world and threaten any country.103 Not once mentioning “U.S. imperialists” or
any enemy for that matter, Hu significantly deviated from earlier, more aggressive speeches that
rallied the country for a continued struggle against a clearly labeled adversary.
This shift in the Korean War narrative suggested the CCP’s attempt to adjust the war
narrative’s international signal to accommodate its new partners—the United States and South
Korea—without alienating the DPRK. After normalization of PRC-ROK relations in 1992, China
received requests from South Korea to amend its textbooks to a less pro-DPRK narrative, and
affirmed to the ROK government its willingness to discuss the matter with relevant textbook
publishers.104 Hu’s lack of any comments on China’s relations with the DPRK, descriptions of
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specific enemies, and characterization of the war as a “victory” (the slogans did imply a victory,
but coverage of Hu’s speech never mentioned the word), all could have been efforts to balance
the conflicting demands of China’s new international partners. The fact that South Korean news
coverage interpreted the event as a reaffirmation of Chinese ties to North Korea suggested that
while China’s new narrative was clearly less emphatic of its PRC-DPRK ties, it was not wholly
conforming to ROK standards either.105 This intentional ambivalence may all the more suggest
the conflicting demands the CCP faced and the party’s attempt to placate all counterparts
involved.
Meanwhile, the narrative’s domestic orientation may have been in coordination with the
CCP’s Patriotic Education Campaign. Launched in 1991, the campaign aimed at educating
China’s new generation of the country’s “humiliating” past, the role of the “West” in China’s
suffering, and the CCP’s role in reviving the country’s glory.106 As the CCP’s response to the
Tiananmen Square incident, this campaign “used historical education as an instrument for the
glorification of the party, for the consolidation of the PRC’s national identity, and for the
justification of . . . the CCP’s one party rule.”107 The new Korean War narrative fit squarely into
this mold: the “West”—the United States—threatened China’s national security, but China was
able to persevere under the “wise” leadership of the CCP, and the new generation must learn
from this historical past and continue to mobilize under the CCP’s guidance. Here again, the
Korean War narrative thus served a dual purpose: domestically, to rally the public and bolster the
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CCP’s legitimacy after the Tiananmen Square incident, and internationally, to balance the
historical claims of both new and existing diplomatic partners.

xi)

2000: Jiang Zemin’s Speech
In 2000, the CCP hosted a 50th anniversary event for the PVA’s entry to the Korean

War.108 In his speech, Jiang Zemin, then President of the PRC, highlighted the Korean War
“spirit,” discouraged military buildup, and touted ethnic diversity as the key to peace, reflecting
growing domestic ethnic challenges and need for stability to promote economic development.
Meanwhile, by being the first to call the war a “civil war” at an official CCP commemoration
event, Jiang further distanced China from the DPRK and incorporated other international
partners into the Korean War narrative.
Like Hu, Jiang invoked the concept of the “spirit of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding
Korea,” praising the accomplishments of the PVA during the war. Jiang argued that the victory
was the result of the “wise leadership of the CCP and Mao Zedong” that helped realize the PVA’s
“political advantage” and “glorious tradition of [the Chinese] military,” and paid respect to the
“older generation of proletarian revolutionists and Chinese PVA” and “the martyrs.” Jiang then
called for the Chinese people to learn from this “spirit” and moral character and “carry forward
patriotism and revolutionary heroism,” putting this spirit toward the “CCP’s and the country’s
various projects,” including Socialist modernization, unification, and peaceful development of
the world.109
Jiang Zemin 江泽民, “Zai shoudu gejie jinian Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kang Mei yuan Chao chuguo zuozhan wushi
zhounian dahui shang de jianghua” 在首都各界纪念中国人民志愿军抗美援朝出国作战五十周年大会上的讲话 [Speech
delivered at the capital convention of various circles for the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Chinese People’s
Volunteer Army’s going abroad and fighting], People’s Daily — Renmin Ribao (1946-Present), October 26, 2000, accessed
August 16, 2019.
108

109

Ibid.

Han 44
Meanwhile, portraying China as the upholder of international diversity and peace, Jiang
stated that “history ha[d] already proven that . . . strengthening military alliances and military
preparation cannot foster long-term peace,” and that peace was only possible through “respecting
the sovereign decisions of each country’s people and global diversity.”110 Arguing that no country
has the right to claim hegemony or invade other countries’ sovereignties, Jiang characterized
China as “an everlasting firm force of upholding world peace and promoting world progress.”111
Jiang concluded his speech by calling for “all of the CCP and people of all ethnic groups” to
unite under Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the CCP’s
basic line.112
Jiang also further distanced China from the DPRK and accommodated its new
international partners, with two notable changes. Jiang’s speech was the first official CCP
Korean War speech since the 1960s that gave credit to the Soviet Union for assisting China
during the war, signaling improved China-Russia relations.113 More importantly, however,
Jiang’s was the first of all Korean War commemoration speeches to call the war the “Korean
Civil War” and to state that China entered the war “upon the request of the Worker’s Party of
Korea and the North Korean government.”114 This characterization exonerated China from the
liability of the Korean War by suggesting that the war was a strictly Korean issue.
Simultaneously, it elided the United States as the starter of the war, although Jiang nevertheless
blamed the United States for “armed intervention” into Korea and “threatening the safety of the
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newly established People’s Republic of China.”115
Jiang’s speech marked a significant evolution of the Korean War narrative’s international
message, accommodating South Korean and U.S. narratives of the war while avoiding alienation
of the DPRK. With the growth of available Soviet archival material, it became increasingly
difficult to deny that North Korea started the war, and South Korea had been requesting the CCP
to correct its historical narrative to accommodate this fact. Not explicitly stating that North
Korea started the war may have been the CCP’s attempt to not fully reject the North Korean
narrative that the war was its struggle for “liberation” against “imperialist invasion”; the
deliberate use of ambiguity seen in 1993 is applied again.
Nevertheless, the CCP used this edited narrative to signal its discontent toward the United
States. The 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade led to heightened Chinese
anti-U.S. sentiments, with Vice President Hu notably condemning “the barbaric act of NATO, led
by the United States” and translating the bombing as an “invasion” as well as a breach of
“sovereignty” and “justice.”116 If Hu’s response to the bombing could be seen as an adoption of
Korean War “talking points,” Jiang’s speech further bolstered this traditional criticism against the
United States by framing it as guilty of “meddling in other countries affairs.”
Jiang’s presentation of the party as the upholder of diversity, on the other hand, may have
been both a domestic and international message to global criticism of the CCP for human rights
violations, amid government crackdowns against rising ethnic unrest in Xinjiang during the
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1990s.117 His last call for unity of “people of all ethnic groups” sent a domestic message that the
CCP is infallible, particularly in its approach to Chinese minority ethnic groups, and an
international one that it will not accept any foreign criticism on the matter. The Korean War
narrative thus maintained its dual propagandistic value for the CCP even in the 21st century.

xii)

2010: Xi Jinping’s Speech
The latest CCP-led Korean War commemoration event was the 60th anniversary forum

on China’s entering the war in 2010.118 While Xi Jinping, then Vice President of the PRC,
adopted most of Jiang’s narrative, he was more assertive in both domestic and international
messages, further emphasizing ethnic unity and assuming a larger role in the Korean peninsula.
Reiterating that the Korean War was a “victory” in a “righteous war of upholding peace
and resisting invasion,” Xi highlighted the PVA’s patriotism, revolutionary spirit, and
internationalism.119 Emphasizing that commemorating the Korean War was “not for extending
antagonism . . . but to learn from historical experiences to gain long-term lessons,” Xi called for
the country to unite under the CCP and Hu Jintao’s leadership, and promote the party’s socialist
policies and the “great revival of the Chinese people.”120 Xi framed the United States as China’s
antagonist, guilty of forcing the war upon the Chinese people and of “armed interference” in
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Korean affairs. By maintaining that the Korean War was a civil war and that China intervened
only upon the request of the North Korean government, Xi exonerated the CCP from the
potential criticism that it was also guilty of “armed interference.”121 Line by line, Xi’s general
narrative paralleled that of Jiang in its domestic and international messages.
Xi’s speech was unique, however, in that it extensively described the Korean War’s
“victory” as a result of China’s national ethnical unity. Xi stated that the PVA’s “victory . . . [wa]s
inseparable from the vigorous support from people of all ethnicities across the country.”122 Xi
then defined the Korean War “spirit” as “a powerful force of people of all ethnicities across the
country bound by a bitter hatred of a common enemy and vanquishing the enemy to score
victory.”123 Calling for the nation to unite again under the “spirit” of the Korean War, Xi
emphasized the ongoing need for promoting ethnic unity under the CCP’s leadership.
Significantly ramped up from Jiang’s rhetoric of ethnic diversity, Xi’s rallying was most likely a
response to the ongoing ethnic conflicts within China, with memories of the deadly July 2009
Urumqi riots still fresh.124 The rising domestic need for ethnic control thus made its way into the
Korean War narrative through a new emphasis on ethnicity in the description of the 1950s war
effort.
Additionally, unlike Jiang who distanced China from the Korean peninsula, Xi assigned a
greater role to China in maintaining peace in the region to prevent spillover instability in Chinese
borders. Stating that “fostering . . . a regional environment of good-neighborliness” was
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“necessary” for China’s realization of peaceful development, Xi further emphasized that China
“devot[ed] itself to upholding the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula.”125 Indeed, the
2000s witnessed China’s greater involvement in the peninsula as reflected in China’s role in
running Six Party Talks to discuss North Korea’s denuclearization from 2003. This rhetoric also
echoed the CCP’s so-called “China’s Peaceful Rise” policy to use China’s economy and
diplomacy to allow for the country’s economic growth while catalyzing global peace.126 Xi’s
alteration of the Korean War narrative to fit domestic and international objectives of the CCP
again underlined the versatility of the narrative as a propaganda tool.
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IV.

Significance and Conclusions

The above analysis of the CCP’s Korean War narrative spans 60 years of the party’s
active use of commemoration events as a propaganda platform for communicating its domestic
and international objectives to the public. What, then, do these 60 years tell us?
If the CCP’s sweeping changes to its Korean War narrative can be attributed to
contemporary political needs, then the descriptions that remained constant over time reveal CCP
objectives that are as applicable today as they were since their inception in 1950. The Korean
War commemoration speeches showed four consistencies. First, the war has always been
trumpeted as a victory, despite changes to who is considered responsible for it—China, North
Korea, or both. This description is contrary to what we know today; records of private arguments
between Chinese and Soviet leaders in the 1960s blaming each other for starting the war make it
clear that the CCP did not consider the war as “glorious” as the speeches suggested.127 The
speeches’ consistent portrayal of the decision to enter the war as a brilliant success and
reluctance to admit the war’s shortcomings, then, demonstrate the CCP’s desire to present itself
as an infallible leader of the Chinese people; this perpetual correctness, in turn, is the CCP’s
source of political legitimacy.
In addition to political legitimacy, this consistency may reflect the party’s consideration
of the Chinese military and veterans. Perhaps the government simply could not afford to admit
its mistake and risk disgracing the cause for which thousands of Chinese soldiers had lost their
lives. The military’s significant role in the Chinese political sphere may also increase the CCP’s
reluctance to admit its mistake, since doing so may bring not only the party’s competence but

See, for instance, the discussion between Chinese Politburo member Peng Zhen and Soviet Communist Party Chairman Nikita
Khrushchev on June 22, 1960, during their meeting in Bucharest, Romania. Yang Kuisong, “Introduction,” in Mao, Stalin and the
Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s (Milton Park, Abingdon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 2-3.
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also the military’s on the line. The fact that these speeches consistently paid homage to martyrs
and that recent speeches even credited the “older generation of revolutionaries and the PVA” for
the “victory” of the Korean War doubly suggests the CCP’s wariness of the military.
Yet another explanation is that the CCP is trying to alleviate domestic fear of the United
States by portraying China as its legitimate—and victorious—challenger. Yu Yong Tae’s study on
Chinese textbooks, for instance, argues that the Chinese government aimed at relieving Chinese
students’ fear toward the United States and strengthening their nationalist sentiments by
trumpeting the Korean War as a massive success.128 The speeches’ continued labeling the United
States as China’s opponent further suggests the CCP’s self-perceived rivalry with the United
States and consequential desire to eliminate domestic fear toward this national rival.
Indeed, a second continuity in these speeches is that the adversary of the war is always
clear: the United States. While the level of blame attached to the United States fluctuated over
time, the title bestowed to the war—“the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea”—left the
CCP’s ultimate adversary obvious. Even speeches that criticized South Korea’s “invasion” of
North Korea claimed that the United States “ordered” Rhee Syng-man, then South Korean
president, to start the war, and all countries in the UN forces were labeled as U.S. “followers” or
“puppets,” bringing the audience’s attention back to the United States.
A similar attitude of hostility is shown in other sites of CCP commemoration of the
Korean War. Jung Keun-Sik’s research even reveals that when the Memorial of the War to Resist
U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was opened in 1993, there was internal debate on whether “the
U.S. Seventh Fleet's blockade of the Taiwan Strait . . . should be described as an ‘invasion’ or an
Yu Yong-Tae 유용태, “Jungguk yeoksagyogwaseoui hyeondaesa insikgwa gukgajuui: hyeondae hanguksareul jungsimeuro”
중국 역사교과서의 현대사 인식과 국가주의: 현대 한국사를 중심으로 [Modern History Awareness and Nationalism in
Chinese History Textbooks: Focusing on Modern Korean History], The Korean History Education Review 84 (December 2002):
213.
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‘entry’ into Chinese territorial waters.”129 Despite Jiang Zemin’s concern that “the expression
could lead to diplomatic problems,” ultimately “the Chinese leadership went with ‘invasion,’
maintaining the conventional Chinese narrative that the Korean War resulted from an American
invasion.”130
That the CCP deliberately chose to maintain this narrative of hostility even after
normalization of U.S.-PRC relations suggests that the party saw political advantages in doing so
that outweighed the risk of potential “diplomatic problems.” One possible explanation, as
suggested above, is that the CCP genuinely sees the United States as its rival—if not an enemy—
to this day. Indeed, as Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote to “hide your strength and bide your time”
implies, the CCP may be perceiving the United States as a rival to be fought against for more
international leadership or even potentially in direct military terms. If true, then this notion will
bear major significance in understanding the PRC’s future global role and its motives behind
contemporary policies of international expansion, directly addressing the decades-long debate on
the future of U.S.-China relations and the possibility of avoiding competition between the two
countries.131
Third, the CCP never revealed that the DPRK started the Korean War; the blame was
instead attached to the United States, South Korea under U.S. orders, or not mentioned
altogether. This reluctance to blame North Korea can be seen as the CCP’s implicit support of the
DPRK while balancing competing demands from the ROK for a revised historical narrative. By
not refuting the DPRK’s claim that it did not begin the war and saving the DPRK from
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international embarrassment, the CCP signaled that it was still attentive to the needs and
demands of North Korea, one of China’s few remaining Communist allies. Against the backdrop
of recent speculations on how far China will push North Korea to give up its nuclear arsenal, this
reluctance of the CCP to completely severe ties with North Korea, even as it distanced itself from
the DPRK more than ever, bears all the more significance in shedding light on the often elusive
PRC policies toward North Korea.132
Lastly, despite the speeches’ characterization of the PRC as a peace-cherishing state, they
consistently justified China’s entry to the Korean War in terms of national security, suggesting
the CCP’s willingness to use military power beyond its borders in the face of security threats.
This implication highlights the CCP’s notion of maintaining buffer states around its borders, and
equating an attack on any of these states as a direct attack on China. That the CCP has never
altered this argument to protect a buffer state for the sake of national security imply that, should
push come to shove, the party may be willing to opt for that path again, which would have
significant implications to Asia’s regional security.

Beyond the fine print, however, the case of Korean War commemoration holds
significance of its own. As the first international war that the PRC engaged in, it set the
precedent for all later national mobilization speeches and propaganda against perceived
international threats. Indeed, although DPRK-led events were not included in this study due to its
scope, some CCP leaders’ speeches in such events demonstrated the party’s adoption of Korean

See, for instance, Zhu Feng, “China’s North Korean Liability: How Washington Can Get Beijing to Rein In Pyongyang,”
Foreign Affairs, July 11, 2017, accessed January 28, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-07-11/chinasnorth-korean-liability; and Evan Osnos, “Why China Won’t Pressure North Korea As Much As Trump Wants,” New Yorker,
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War “talking points” in other border conflicts. For instance, at the DPRK embassy’s 1962 Korean
War commemoration event, State Council Deputy Prime Minister Luo Ruiqing accused India of
lacking “sincerity” to resolve the China-India border issue peacefully, claiming that if India had
such sincerity, it would not reject China’s suggestion of a peaceful resolution.133 This rhetoric
paralleled that of Zhou Enlai’s 1953 declaration on Korean War armistice discussions, where he
argued that if the UN forces had the “sincere desire to seek peace,” they would be able to accept
China’s “reasonable” suggestions.134 Hu Jintao’s aforementioned 1999 response to the NATO
bombing similarly suggested the adoption of Korean War propaganda for other military conflicts,
with the familiar argument that China is a peace-cherishing nation striving to reach a peaceful
resolution even when under siege of belligerent states.135 Studying the CCP’s Korean War
narrative can thus greatly contribute to understanding how CCP propaganda for later conflicts
developed and how the party communicates its foreign policy objectives to its domestic public.
More broadly, the Korean War exemplifies how states use historical narratives as a
malleable political propaganda tool. Especially when there is insufficient or mixed information
on the given state’s objectives—as was the case for China and North Korea—public
commemoration of historical events that reflect major domestic and global politics may thus
serve as a reliable source for understanding state intentions. This method can be especially useful
for studying single-party, authoritarian governments; the connection between the narrative and
“Zhongguo renmin yongyuan zhichi Guba geming” 中国人民永远支持古巴革命 [The Chinese people will support the
Cuban Revolution forever], PLA Daily, October 26, 1962, accessed October 12, 2019, https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/
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the state’s political objectives would be clearer since there would be fewer competing
perspectives, while the state’s stricter control of available information would all the more require
measures to glean insights from public sources.

The year in which this research is conducted coincides with the 70th anniversary of the
Korean War. From Xi’s initial cold shoulder to Kim Jong-un to his first visit to the DPRK in June
20, 2019, from Trump’s rhetoric of “fire and fury” to the first U.S.-DPRK summit, and from
tensions over the South China Sea to the recent signs of peace after the U.S.-PRC trade war, the
years 2011 to 2020 have witnessed significant developments in China’s relations with its East
Asian neighbors and the United States.136 This year’s 70th anniversary commemoration of the
Korean War would be a promising opportunity to understand how the CCP interpreted this
tumultuous period and how it plans to navigate another eventful decade to come.
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Bibliographic Essay
Coming to the topic of this essay was a natural combination of three key academic
interests that I pursued at Yale: international relations of Northeast Asia; historical narrative as
both the result and influencer of these relations; and my native country, Korea. If I were to
pinpoint a time, however, it would be the latter half of the year 2017, amid North Korea’s
ramping up of nuclear missile tests and U.S. President Donald Trump’s warnings of U.S.
response of “fire and fury.”137 During the outpour of speculations about the future of the Korean
peninsula, one topic did not cease to appear: what would the PRC do? Indeed, a multitude—if
not an overwhelming majority—of scholars and reporters assumed that U.S. success in curbing
North Korean missile tests would depend on China’s cooperation; what they disagreed upon was
whether China would get on board with the United States.138 Existing articles on China’s
strategic and political goals toward North Korea focused primarily on the beginning of the two
countries’ relations from the Korean War in 1950, then shifted directly to contemporary relations
of the 2000s.139 The lack of explanation in between seemed to assert that China’s policy toward
the DPRK has remained constant throughout those decades, a notion I found highly unlikely.
Considering the tumultuous changes in China’s political priorities and diplomatic relations—
especially rapprochement with the United States and South Korea—I believed that PRC-DPRK
relations would have undergone significant changes. Fortuitously, I was at the time taking a
course on China’s use of the past, studying how the CCP actively uses historical narratives to fit
For instance, see Joshua Berlinger, “North Korea’s Missile Tests: What You Need to Know,” CNN News, December 3, 2017,
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Starr, and Zachary Cohen, “Trump Promises North Korea ‘Fire and Fury’ over Nuke Threat,” CNN Politics, August 9, 2017,
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its political goals. Hence, I started to look into how China has crafted its historical narrative
about North Korea, by studying the event that is credited to have founded the modern PRCDPRK relationship: the Korean War.
A number of primary sources came to my mind. My initial choice was publications on the
history of the war, such as the History of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.140
These books, most often compiled or approved by the Chinese military, no doubt offered a
historical narrative of the Korean War curated directly by the government. However, most of
these books were published in relatively recent years, with no publications during the 1960s and
70s. Additionally, most of them were written by the military; I quickly realized that I did not
have the relevant background knowledge to fully appreciate the provided military details and,
even if I did, these would offer more tactical insights than strategic or political ones.
Another promising group of sources was memoirs by veterans or generals that
participated in the war.141 Most of these were published in the 1980s, spurred by the posthumous
rehabilitation of Peng Dehuai in 1978, leading Marshal of the PVA who was denounced for
criticizing CCP policies during the Great Leap Forward.142 These memoirs provided raw
accounts of the war, both on the battlefield and within government cabinets; the memoirs of
generals also offered valuable insights into the decision-making process and strategic priorities
of the CCP during watershed moments of the Korean War. These narratives, however, only
Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiusuo 军事科学院军事历史研究所 [Military History Unit of the Academy of Military
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Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea], 3 vols (Beijing, China: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 2014).
140

Examples include Peng Dehuai 彭德怀, Peng Dehuai Zishu 彭德怀自述 [Peng Dehuai’s Memoir] (Beijing: Jiefangjun
chubanshe, 1981); Nie Rongzhen 聂荣臻, Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu 聂荣臻回忆录 [Nie Rongzhen’s Memoirs] (Beijing: Jiefangjun
chubanshe, 1984); and Cai Chengwen 柴成文, Banmendian Tanpan 板门店谈判 [Panmunjom Negotiations] (Beijing: Jiefangjun
chubanshe, 1989). A major English translation of key leaders’ memoirs, albeit abridged, include Li Xiaobing, Allan Reed Millett,
and Yu Bin, Mao’s Generals Remember Korea (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001).
141

Wanli Hu, Mao’s American Strategy and the Korean War (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008), 10; the Editors of
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. “Peng Dehuai,” last updated October 20, 2019, accessed November 20,
2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Peng-Dehuai.
142

Han 57
focused on the outbreak and immediate aftermaths of the war; the “afterlife” of it was rarely if
ever included. Since these works were not published by the CCP, it was also unclear how
reflective they were of the government’s official perspective.
These memoirs’ invocation of certain slogans or CCP leaders’ speeches, however, led me
to another primary source—commemoration speeches by CCP leaders. Delivered by party
leaders themselves, these speeches directly presented the official stance of the CCP, and often
offered justifications and explained the military and political significance of the war. What
distinguished these speeches, however, was the fact that these commemorative events were held
relatively regularly since 1950. In terms of tracking the CCP’s interpretation of and political
goals relevant to the Korean War over time, these speeches thus proved to be ideal primary
sources. Since most of these speeches were widely circulated in the news, I also had easy access
to these sources, thanks to Yale’s resources including the online archive of the People’s Daily.
Upon digging, however, I faced two main obstacles. First, in the People’s Daily, there
was a visible dearth of Korean War commemoration events from the early 1960s to the late 80s,
which made tracing the change of CCP stance over a continuous time frame rather difficult.
More critical, however, was that my Chinese language skills, while capable of comprehending
the speeches, were not high enough to digest decades’ worth of speeches at a reasonable speed.
To address these limitations, I took a gap year and enrolled in an intensive Chinese
language program at Tsinghua University; with my improved Chinese skills, I also tried looking
into more sources. I first attempted to access the Foreign Ministry Archive of the PRC, but was
told that I would require a letter of recommendation from a Chinese local institution, which I did
not have the means to acquire. Knowing that studies on historiography often use textbooks to
understand how states craft standardized, “official” historical narratives, I also exhausted the
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history textbook collection of the National Library of China, but its limitations were significant
as well. Since mandatory education began during Deng Xiaoping’s years, this particular medium
most likely did not reach a wide audience until at least the 1970s. The library’s incomplete
collection of older textbooks, the variety of publishers, and multiple grade levels for history
courses also made finding a comprehensive collection practically impossible. Lastly, since
textbooks focused more on providing an overview of history than an in-depth study of one event,
their coverage of the Korean War were insufficient in both volume and depth.
Faced with these limitations, I ultimately decided to focus on speeches. To complement
the dearth of speeches in the People’s Daily, I added another publication—the People’s
Liberation Army Daily—to the list. I also combed through the selected works by key leaders of
the CCP to ensure the collection was as complete as possible. These measures led me to over a
thousand articles, and I ended up trimming the list to focus on speeches that were designed for
Chinese domestic audiences and, when there were multiple speeches for a given year, more
weight was given to those delivered by higher-ranking CCP members.

Finding adequate secondary sources also proved to be a challenge. Since the war was
interpreted differently by each country involved, I combined resources available at Yale, Korean
national databases, and the National Library of China to get a more balanced overview. Some of
these researches proved critical in formulating my research approach, a sample of which I
highlight below.
While the Korean War itself has been extensively studied, the historical memory of the
war is surprisingly under-researched, with the majority of English studies focusing instead on
explaining the origin of the war and Chinese intervention. One promising work from this
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category, however, was Allen Whiting’s 1960 book, China Crosses the Yalu, which inspired
generations of Korean War scholars by notably disagreeing with the then-popular U.S.
understanding of the Korean War as an ideological war and instead arguing that China’s
intervention was driven primarily by security concerns, thus applying a realpolitik framework to
the war.143 Whiting’s book was significant not only in that it revealed a key strategic goal for the
CCP—protection of national interests in a non-ideological, realist sense—but also in its use of
CCP propaganda material as its major primary source. That Whiting’s deduction of the CCP’s
political goals came from propaganda speeches and news publications, and that later generations
of studies on the Korean War have reinforced Whiting’s seminal analysis, confirmed my
conviction that commemoration speeches can be used to accurately track the CCP’s objectives.
Another important group of works looks into the PRC-DPRK relations during the war
and the immediately following years. Shen Zhihua’s works have been the most notable on this
topic.144 While Shen published a number of papers in this field, his most important work would
be his book with Xia Yafeng, A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and SinoNorth Korean Relations. Here Shen and Xia trace the ups and downs of PRC-DPRK relations,
marking watershed moments such as the death of Stalin and end of the Korean War, the purge of
the Yan’an faction in DPRK by Kim in the mid 1950s, the Sino-Soviet split, and the detente
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between China and the United States.145 These works convinced me that PRC-DPRK relations
have changed significantly over time and that the CCP would have had to readjust its narrative
about its relationship with DPRK, potentially through the Korean War.
A handful of studies focus on the war mobilization efforts and public reception of such
movements during the 1950s. Hajimu Masuda, for instance, explores in his book Cold War
Crucible how the concept of the Cold War became perceived and translated into reality, and how
individual understandings of the Cold War were shaped by historical memories and experiences
specific to a given nation.146 Regarding the Korean War, Masuda demonstrates how the Chinese
people linked their bitterness toward the Japanese with their attitude toward the United States,
and how that allowed for widespread war mobilization of the Chinese people.147 Masuda’s study
also notes the Chinese people’s differing responses to the Korean War after its outbreak, and how
the state and masses used mobilization efforts to eliminate social and political dissent, thereby
solidifying their imagined reality of the Cold War. Masuda’s work offered insights into what
domestic political pressure the CCP wanted to address during this period, which in turn allowed
for comparison of the CCP’s political objectives and propaganda messages between then and
later years.
There were a few studies that directly addressed the CCP’s commemoration of the
Korean War, which formed the foundation of my analysis of Korean War commemoration
speeches. Studies on Chinese textbook portrayals of Korea highlighted for me shifts in China’s
historical narrative over time, with watershed moments including U.S.-PRC normalizations and

Shen Zhihua, and Xia Yafeng, A Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and Sino-North Korean Relations,
1949-1976 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018), 4-5.
145

Hajimu Masuda, Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard
University Press, 2015).
146

147

Ibid.

Han 61
South Korea’s rapid economic development.148 Jung Keun-Sik’s study of the Memorial of the
War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea gave me more clarity in some political goals that
the CCP was trying to accomplish through its Korean War narrative, such as state formation,
nation building, and positioning China as a world power and legitimate challenger of the United
States.149 From these works, I learned what political and propagandistic value the CCP has
attached to the Korean War, and familiarized myself with watershed events that influenced the
Korean War narrative in other sources, which allowed me to compare these narratives to the
changes (and lack thereof) observed in that of commemoration speeches.

Besides primary and secondary sources, there is another source of guidance which was as
important as, if not more important than, my research material. I am incredibly grateful to
Professor Denise Ho, whose instructions, guidance, and advice made possible not only this
senior essay but also my growth as a writer and a student of history. My journey as a History
major would not have been possible without Professor Fabian Drixler, whose academic advice
and guidance have been invaluable throughout my time at Yale. I am thankful for the generous
support by the Richard U. Light Fellowship that made my three terms in China possible. Last but
not least, I am infinitely grateful to my family and friends, who have been an unwavering source
of encouragement and support—across multiple time zones, from Seoul to New Haven, through
thick and thin—without which this thesis would have been impossible.
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